We construct a publicly verifiable protocol for proving computational work based on collision-resistant hash functions and a new plausible complexity assumption regarding the existence of "inherently sequential" hash functions. Our protocol is based on a novel construction of time-lock puzzles. Given a sampled "puzzle" P $ ← Dn, where n is the security parameter and Dn is the distribution of the puzzles, a corresponding "solution" can be generated using N evaluations of the sequential hash function, where N > n is another parameter, while any feasible adversarial strategy for generating valid solutions must take at least as much time as Ω(N ) sequential evaluations of the hash function after receiving P. Thus, valid solutions constitute a "proof" that Ω(N ) parallel time elapsed since P was received. Solutions can be publicly and efficiently verified in time poly(n) · polylog(N ). Applications of these "time-lock puzzles" include noninteractive timestamping of documents (when the distribution over the possible documents corresponds to the puzzle distribution Dn) and universally verifiable CPU benchmarks.
INTRODUCTION
A timestamping scheme is a mechanism for proving that a document was created before a certain time in the past. Timestamping schemes have variety of applications, including the resolution of intellectual property disputes (e.g., an inventor may timestamp her invention to prevent future patent challenges) and providing evidence of predictive powers (e.g., a stock analyst could prove that she correctly predicted stock price changes before they occurred).
We say a timestamping scheme is noninteractive if generating a timestamp does not require communication with a third party. This is a desirable property, both because it makes timestamping easily scalable (multiple parties generating timestamps do not interfere with each other), and it allows parties to hide the fact that they are generating a timestamp; this might be crucial in some scenarios (e.g., an inventor may not wish to reveal the fact that she has a new invention).
A natural cryptographic approach to timestamping is via proofs of work-use computational effort invested as a measure of time elapsed. For example, if a party wants to be able to issue future proofs that she knows a document D at time t0, then starting at time t0, she starts to evaluate a "moderately hard" function g on document D. If we know that g takes time ≈ N to evaluate, then the value g(D) can be considered a "proof" that D was known N time units in the past.
Note that here we need both an upper bound and a lower bound on the complexity of computing g-an adversary should not be able to evaluate g on D much more quickly than an honest party following the specified algorithm for g. In addition, we would like verifying y = g(D) (given D and y) to be done much more efficiently than evaluating g on D from scratch.
These (initial) goals can be achieved by taking g = f −1
for a very strong one-way permutation f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , where we take the security parameter to be n = log N . Given a document D ∈ {0, 1} n , the proof of work f −1 (D) can be computed by brute force in time approximately 2 n = N . Such a proof can be verified very quickly (e.g., in time poly(n) = poly(log N )). Moreover, it is a plausible assumption that any efficient 1 algorithm for inverting f will require time Ω(2 n ) = Ω(N ), at least on a uniformly random docu-
(If D is not uniformly distributed, then we can heuristically apply this construction to a hash of D, or even apply a publicly known deterministic randomness extractor tailored to the distribution Dn from which D is sampled.)
One deficiency of the aforementioned construction is that, while it certifies that N units of computational effort were invested after receiving D, this need not correspond to clock time, because an adversary could parallelize its computational efforts (e.g., by using a bot-net to try many preimages at once). Thus, we would like to have proofs of work that are inherently sequential, i.e., even a massively parallel effort to evaluate g(D) would still take time close to N . (Of course, "time" is still relative to single-core CPU speed, which may differ between the honest party and the adversary, but this gap should be easier to gauge and control than what can be achieved by massive parallelism.)
Based on ideas from [CLSY93, RSW96] , Jerschow and Mauve [JM10] proposed the following timestamping function which is conjectured to be secure against parallel attack: g(D) = 2 2 D (mod N ), for an RSA integer N whose factors are kept secret. A verifier who already knows the secret factorization of N can check the computation efficiently using the "shortcut" 2 this shortcut gives an exponential speed-up. The security of this scheme is based on the conjecture that modular exponentiation is an inherently sequential task without knowing the factorization of N .
Time-Lock Puzzles. The idea of using modular exponentiation as a proof of sequential work was first proposed by Cai, Lipton, Sedgewick and Yao [CLSY93] , in the context of CPU benchmarks, and by Rivest, Shamir and Wagner [RSW96] in the context of time-lock puzzles. In a time-1 Here the adversary is assumed to be uniform, because a non-uniform attacker can in fact invert a one-way permutation in time 2 cn for some constant c < 1 [Hel80, FN99, DTT10] . lock puzzle protocol, solving a puzzle should take approximately N time (even for a massively parallel solver), while generating the puzzle and verifying the solution should take considerably less. Thus, one can think of a time-lock puzzle as an interactive proof of sequential work and view a solution to the puzzle as a proof that at least roughly N time units have elapsed since the prover received the puzzle.
When used as a timestamping scheme, however, modular exponentiation has a serious drawback: the verifier must know and keep secret the factorization of the modulus. In practice, this means that the timestamper must decide in advance which verifiers to target. Moreover, if a verifier's secret key ever leaks, all timestamps using the corresponding public key can no longer be trusted.
To construct publicly verifiable timestamping schemes from time-lock puzzles, we employ public-coin time-lock puzzles and interpret the document D as the coin tosses generating the puzzle P.
Generic Proofs of Work via Efficient Arguments.
Suppose we are given an inherently sequential function family: {fP : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1} n } P∈{0,1} poly(n) , meaning that the t-fold composition f t P (0 n ) takes parallel time Ω(t) for a uniformly random P $ ← {0, 1} poly(n) . A natural attempt to construct a proof of work is to use simple iteration of f : the prover chooses a function fP from the family (determined by the puzzle P) and begins with an initial fixed value x0 = 0 n . In iteration i, the prover computes xi = fP (xi−1) = f i P (x0). Assuming that every adversary that outputs f t P (x) must run in time Ω(t), sending xt to the verifier constitutes a proof of Ω(t) work. We can make the verification time polylogarithmic in t by using an efficient (public-coin) argument system to prove that xt was computed correctly. Efficient argument systems can be constructed based on collisionresistant hash functions [Kil92, Mic00, BG08] and can be made noninteractive in the ROM.
This approach appears conceptually simple, but hides complexity in the construction of the argument system: existing schemes all make use of complex Probabilistically Checkable Proofs (PCPs) , and this appears to be an inherent property of efficient argument systems [RV10] . In contrast, the constants hidden in the asymptotic notation of our constructions are very small (see Theorem 3.7 for the parameters). A second drawback of the generic scheme is that it is nonblack-box (a proof that xt was "computed correctly" necessarily uses the code of the algorithm computing f ). As well as being of theoretical interest, a black-box construction has practical advantages: the implementation can be made in a modular way, changing the underlying sequential function can be done easily and it may even be replaced with a hardware module (or a corresponding physical assumption).
Our Results
In this paper, following Mahmoody et. al [MMV11] , we study proofs of work (in the spirit of Dwork, Goldberg, Naor, and Wee [DN92, DGN03, DNW05] ) and noninteractive timestamping.
Time-Lock Puzzles and Noninteractive Timestamping. Our main result is the first black-box construction of a time-lock puzzle (secure against parallel attack) with a public-coin puzzle generator. As described above, this implies a publicly verifiable, noninteractive timestamping scheme. Our construction relies on the existence of collision-resistant hash functions and a new assumption that sequential hash functions exist; these are functions where it is infeasible to find any "hash chain" of length N in time ≪ N , even if the adversary enjoys massive parallel computing power (see Definition 3.2 for a formalization). Note that both assumptions hold in the random oracle model.
The following theorem states our main result informally; see Theorem 3.7 for a formal statement. The verification time for our time-lock puzzle (and the corresponding timestamping scheme) can be poly-logarithmic in the time it takes to solve the puzzle, and the soundness time-gap (the ratio between the running time of the honest solver and that of a successful adversarial solver) is bounded by a constant. That is, our honest solver evaluates the hash function N times, and any adversary whose solution is accepted by an honest verifier must have used time proportional to c · N sequential evaluations of the hash function for a constant c. Our construction is fully black box (in the terminology of [RTV04] ). After the puzzle is generated noninteractively, the verification process for both the time-lock puzzle and corresponding timestamping scheme are interactive protocols (a noninteractive timestamping scheme may still have an interactive verification stage). However, since our construction is fully black box, it is unconditionally secure in the random oracle model, and in this model we can make the verification noninteractive using the Fiat-Shamir Heuristic.
Universally Verifiable Benchmarks. Cai et al. [CLSY93] suggested using proofs of work for running "uncheatable" benchmarks. Their idea is that a vendor can prove a supercomputer's performance by having it run a proof of work that is timed by the verifier. The soundness of the proof-ofwork protocol would guarantee that vendors couldn't cheat by optimizing their code or modifying it in some other way. Cai et al. proposed using exponentiation modulo an RSA integer as the candidate function. This has the drawback, however, of being verifier-specific (since only the verifier who generated the modulus and knows the secret factorization can trust the results). Using our time-lock puzzle construction, combined with a public randomness beacon, this benchmark can be made "universally verifiable": the randomness beacon would be used as the puzzle generator (assuming that the beacon's output in the next time period cannot be predicted by the vendor), and the vendor would publish the solution. Since there is no secret information, anyone can verify the results of the benchmark.
Combinatorial Tools. Our construction involves a novel use of depth-robust graphs: these are directed acyclic graphs on N vertices with low degree (e.g. polylog N ) whose depth remains Ω(N ) even after removing any constant fraction of vertices. To prove that it has done a lot of computational work, our prover constructs a labeling of the vertices of a depth-robust graph G where each vertex v should be labeled with uv = HP (uv 1 , . . . , uv d ), where v1, . . . , v d are all vertices that have edges pointing to v, P is the puzzle, and H is a family of sequential hash-functions. (This is welldefined and can be computed with O(N ) hash evaluations due to the acyclicity of G.) It then sends the verifier a short commitment to this labeling through a Merkle tree (see Section C) computed using a collision-resistant hash function. During the verification, the prover is then asked to reveal the labels of a few randomly chosen vertices v along with their in-neighbors, and the verifier checks that uv = HP (uv 1 , . . . , uv d ) holds for each such vertex v. Intuitively, if the prover can pass this check for a large fraction of vertices v, due to depth-robustness of G, the labeling constructed by the prover must have a hash chain of length Ω(N ), and the prover must have used time proportional to Ω(N ) sequential evaluations of the hash function.
Depth-robust graphs were investigated in the 70's and 80's, motivated by efforts to prove lower-bounds on circuit complexity and Turing machine time [EGS75, Val77, PR80, Sch82, Sch83] . We use a construction of Erdős, Graham and Szemerédi [EGS75] , which involves a recursive use of constant-degree expander graphs. For different settings of parameters, depth-robust graphs are related to matrix rigidity and the "grate" property of graphs, defined by Valiant [Val77] . As far as we know, our work is the first "positive" use of depth-robust graphs.
In the random oracle model (ROM), we assume that all parties have oracle access to a public random function O :
n (where n is the security parameter). The ROM provides us with a clean and convenient way of lowerbounding both the total work invested by a party (namely the number of oracle queries) and the parallel time invested (the number of rounds of adaptivity in oracle queries). For this measure of computation time, it can be easily shown that a random oracle is sequential (a proof appears in Section A). Since our constructions make only black-box use of the hash functions, they are unconditionally secure in the ROM.
Although random oracles do not exist in the real world, a common heuristic for instantiating protocols in the randomoracle model is to replace the oracle with a cryptographic hash function (e.g., SHA-256) [BR93, FS86a] . While no concrete hash-function can satisfy all the properties of an ideal random oracle (in fact, there are examples of schemes that are provably insecure for any instantiation of the oracle by a concrete hash function [CGH04, GT03] ), it seams reasonable to conjecture that these functions are highly sequential.
Related Work
Timestamping. While physical timestamps have been in use for many years (e.g., having a notary public physically stamp a document) their introduction to the digital realm, by Haber and Stornetta [HS91] , was more recent. Haber and Stornetta's main idea relies on a Timestamping Service (TSS): a trusted third party that is responsible for generating and managing the timestamps. Further work in this direction has improved communication and computational complexity, and allowed the use of an untrusted TSS (for examples, see [ABSW01, BHS92, BdM91, BdM93, BL98, BLLV98,BLS00]). The state-of-the-art schemes using thirdparty Timestamping Services are efficient, can give very precise timestamps and even hide the contents of a document that is stamped, but necessarily reveal the fact that a party is stamping some document.
The first construction of a noninteractive timestamping scheme was given by by computing the hash labels of G using a random oracle and taking the label of the output nodes as T . The crucial property of the hash graph G is that the adversary should not be able to compute T by accessing the main memory only "a few" times and is forced to encounter many cache misses. The hash graph G of [DNW05] is constructed by concatenating two subgraph DAGs: G1 and G2 (where inputs of G2 are the outputs of G1) as follows. The DAG G1 is a super-concentrator (from [PTC77] ) which is a sparse graph with high connectivity: for any set S of s input nodes and any set T of s outputs nodes there are s vertex disjoint paths from S to T . The graph G2 is a shallow DAG (of logarithmic depth) which is robust in the following sense: by removing any "small fraction" of the nodes of G2 (together with their incident edges), still a "large fraction" of the inputs remain connected to a "large fraction" of the outputs. Thus, at a high level, [DNW05] also uses some robust DAGs as we do in this work but with a different notion of robustness; their graphs are shallow and are robust against losing connectivity of input and outputs, while our graphs have large depth and preserve (most of) this depth even after removing some fraction of the nodes. Bypassing a Lower-Bound. Mahmoody, Moran and Vadhan considered time-lock puzzles in the random oracle model [MMV11] and proved that for a large class of time-lock puzzles, a large gap between generation/verification time and time to solve the puzzle is not possible. This class of timelock puzzles include those in which the verifier does not query the oracle, which includes as a special case puzzles in which the generator produces a solution (sent to the verifier) together with the puzzle itself. For any such puzzle, they show that if it requires t oracle queries to generate the puzzle, the puzzle can be solved in t adaptive rounds of queries (with only a polynomial overhead in the total number of queries compared to the honest solver). We bypass the lower-bound of [MMV11] by constructing a verifier that does indeed query the oracle, and in fact our construction gives a time-lock puzzle with a super-polynomial gap between solution and verification times.
Non

TIME-LOCK PUZZLES AND TIMESTAMP-ING, FORMAL DEFINITIONS
In this section we formalize the notion of time-lock puzzles and its relation to proofs of work.
Definition 2.1. A time-lock puzzle is a game between three parties (Gen, Sol, Ver) who receive the common input 1 n for security parameter n and N = poly(n) > n as the "complexity of the puzzle" and act as follows.
The puzzle generator Gen generates a "puzzle" P.
2. The puzzle solver Sol receives the puzzle P and outputs some "solution" S in time N · poly(n) (where poly(n) here is independent of N ).
The verifier Ver receives the puzzle P and a solution S and either accepts or rejects. (This step could be noninteractive or through interaction with
Sol-see the discussion below).
We require the following properties. The exact definition of the running time function Time(·) and its parallel variant
ParTime(·) depend on the underlying computational model.
• Completeness. In an honest execution Ver accepts with probability 1 − negl(n).
• (Parallel) η-Soundness. Time Gap. For our applications, we are interested in timelock puzzles where there is a time-gap between solving a puzzle (honestly or maliciously) and time it takes to verify a solution.
On Parallel Soundness. Intuitively, this guarantees that a successful Sol, after receiving the puzzle, must have invested almost as much computational effort in terms of paralleltime complexity, as the honest solver Sol does in terms of its running time (η measures the "slowdown factor" of the honest solver compared to the parallel-time of the adversarywhen η = 1 the adversary cannot solve any faster than the honest solver even with massive parallelism, while when η = 1/2 the adversary can run in half the time of the honest solver). Note that we allow the adversary to perform arbitrary polynomial-time preprocessing before receiving the puzzle. For simplicity, we omit this from the definition above. However, our proof of security holds for a non-uniform adversary; in particular, this means we allow the adversary to receive arbitrary "advice" (that does not depend on the input, P); any preprocessing done before receiving P can simply be treated as advice.
Interactive Verification. As we mentioned in Definition 2.1, the verification of the puzzle solution may be interactive (i.e., consist of an interactive protocol between the verifier and a "prover" who has access to the secret state of the puzzle solver Sol). The time-lock puzzles we construct in this paper have interactive verifiers. However, since their verification protocols are all public-coin, they can be made noninteractive in the random-oracle model by applying the Fiat-Shamir transformation.
Public vs. Secret Verification. Since the puzzle generator and the verifier in Definition 2.1 do not share any secret information, this definition guarantees that puzzles are "publicly verifiable": the verification protocol can be executed by any interested party. This property is especially useful for noninteractive time-lock puzzles: the solution and proof are both strings and can be easily published. The public verifiability means that anyone who receives the proof can verify it, without needing to trust any third parties. One can also consider an alternative definition of time-lock puzzles in which the puzzle generator and verifier do share secret information. This is the case, for example, in the repeatedsquaring based puzzle of Rivest et al. [RSW96] (the secret information is the factorization of the modulus). The alternative definition is strictly weaker, and limits verification to parties that know the secret.
Timestamping Documents. Now we discuss how our results in the context of time-lock puzzles can be used for noninteractively timestamping documents. The type of timestamps we deal with are relative timestamps: that is, if Alice produces a d-timestamp of a document D at time T then she is claiming that she "knew" the document at time T − d. While relative timestamps can be used to construct absolute timestamps (e.g., by continuously computing d-timestamps for larger and larger d), they may also have direct applications. For example, suppose Alice believes she has solved a hard research problem, but is hesitant to publish before completely verifying her result. She can compute a one-week relative timestamp of her solution and store it; if, at some later time, Bob claims to have solved the problem, Alice has one week in which she can prove that she had a solution first. Our definition of security for timestamping is based on the following intuition: if Bob receives a previously unknown document D ′ at time T0, then at time T0 + d he should not be able to produce a d 
sends (D, d, S) to the verifier and proves that S is a valid d-timestamp of D (this may be done using an interactive protocol). We also demand the following properties (where n is the security parameter).
• Completeness. We require a timestamping scheme to satisfy two completeness properties:
-When parties execute the game honestly Ver accepts with probability 1 − negl(n).
• η-Soundness The soundness of the scheme is parameterized by η ≤ 1 (measuring how much the adversary can cheat on the claimed timestamp duration) and by D, the distribution of documents to be stamped. Consider the following game between an adversary Adv and Ver:
Adv generates (S, d) and sends (D, d, S)
to the verifier Ver. ← D] ≥ 1/ poly(n) (where n is the security parameter) can be thought of as a "typical" document that the adversary can "guess" in advance. Therefore, it is reasonable to restrict ourselves to distributions that satisfy Pr[D $ ← D] ≤ 1/ poly(n) for every D and every polynomial poly(n); namely, the distribution D has super-logarithmic min-entropy. It is plausible to assume we have a family of hash functions CH and SH that are simultaneously secure for all index distributions with super-logarithmic min-entropy (they exist in the random oracle model). Our timestamping scheme will then inherit this property.
Ver and
Security in the Presence of Auxiliary Information.
Note that in Theorem 1.1, the distribution D of the documents is the same as the index distribution of the used hash functions. The distribution D could capture the uncertainty of the adversary about the document D conditioned on the auxiliary information of the adversary about the document. Thus, if we want to guarantee the security of our scheme under any auxiliary information (e.g., knowing only half of the document), as long as there is ω(log n) bits of uncertainty about the final version of the document, we can construct secure timestamping schemes under the assumption that the used hash functions are also secure under any index distribution with super-logarithmic min-entropy.
Timestamping for Unknown Duration.
A desirable feature of a timestamping scheme is to allow the stamper to perform its job without knowing the time period d in advance. A simple trick (that decreases η by a small constant factor) is as follows: The stamper iteratively generates timestamps for d = 1, 2, . . . , 2 i , . . . and always keeps the last generated timestamp as the current timestamp. It is easy to see that this scheme achieves η ′ ≥ η/4. Our time-lock puzzle (using the specific construction of depth-robust graphs from Section B) construction satisfies an even stronger property, making it particularly suited for timestamping documents without knowing the duration in advance. In our construction, for d2 > d1, the computation Sol d 1 (P ) is a prefix of the computation Sol d 2 (P ); thus, it is possible to run the stamper continuously, generating timestamps of increasing duration and without paying the constant factor in η.
CONSTRUCTING TIME-LOCK PUZZLES
In this section we prove our main result which is a new construction of publicly verifiable time-lock puzzle based on sequential hash functions and collision-resistant hash functions.
Outline and High-Level Ideas
The high-level idea is to force the solver to compute a labeling of a DAG G as a "hash-graph" in which each node is labeled with the hash of its in-neighbors' labels. The soundness of of our construction will rely on a computational assumption about the hashes-namely that they are inherently sequential (see Definition 3.2 below for a formalization). The sequentiality of the hash functions ensures that any adversary that can output the label of an endpoint of a correct path in the graph must spend time at least proportional to the length of the path (i.e., there are no "shortcuts"). To check a proposed solution to the puzzle, the verifier will test random nodes in the graph and check if they were computed correctly. We use an underlying DAG that has a special combinatorial property called depth-robustness: in any large subset of the nodes of the hash-graph there is a "long" path (see Definition 3.6). To achieve η-soundness with η arbitrarily close to one we employ a modified version of the depth-robust DAGs constructed by Erdős, Graham, and Szemerédi [EGS75] (see Section B).
If too many nodes in the graph are badly labeled (i.e., their labels are not the hash of their in-neighbors' labels) the verifier will reject the solution with high probability. Thus, if the verifier accepts we can use the combinatorial property of the graph to conclude that there must be a long path consisting of nodes that were "correctly" computed, and from the sequential property of the hash it will follow that the solver must have spent a "long" time performing the computation.
Finally, to reduce the communication and verification time, instead of sending the labeling of the entire graph, the solver will commit to the graph labeling and send only the commitment to the verifier. When the verifier challenges the solver on a specific node in the graph, the solver will send the label of that node and the labels of its in-neighbors, and will prove that these are consistent with the commitment. An efficient commitment scheme with all of the required properties is the Merkle tree, which can be constructed based on any collision-resistant hash function.
Formal Definitions
In this subsection we provide the formal definitions required for stating and proving our theorems. First, we formally define the notion of a sequential function. We first describe the security game. 
The adversary wins if for all i ∈ [N ] it holds that hs(yi−1)
is a contiguous substring of yi.
family of (non-expanding) functions, and D = {Dn} n∈N be a family of distributions over the indexes s ∈ {0, 1} poly(n) of H. The family H is called τ -sequential against D iff for every N = poly(n) and every adversary Adv of the following form, the probability that Adv wins in the game of Construction 3.1 over common inputs n is negl(n): the adversary Adv is a circuit of total size poly(n, N ), but the depth of this circuit till sending over y (in Step 2) is at most τ · N .
The sequentiality parameter τ determines the level of confidence one has in the sequential nature of H and is always at most t(n), where t(n) is the time it takes to call H(·) on an input to get an n-bit output. On an extreme point, for a particular function H, one might believe that getting a sequence of length N really needs N sequential evaluations of the function resulting in τ (n) = t(n).
Our construction also employs a family of collision-resistant hash functions. We use the following generalized definition that holds with respect to particular distributions over the index: 
The Main Theorem
In this section we describe and prove our main result about the existence of time-lock puzzles based on collision-resistant and sequential hash functions. As discussed above, this implies the existence of timestamping protocols (a formal proof appears in Section 2).
Used Hash Functions
be a family of collision resistant hash functions against index distribution D and let SH = {sh : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} n } for m = ω(n · log 3 n) be a τ -sequential function against the same index distribution D. Let t ch (n) denote the time required for an honest user to evaluate ch(x) for ch ∈ CH when ch(x) ∈ {0, 1} n , and similarly, let t sh (n) be the time required for an honest user to evaluate an input for function sh ∈ SH with output in {0, 1}
n . When clear from the context, we drop the index n and use names t sh , t ch , etc.
Theorem 3.7 (Main Result). Let n be the security parameter, N = poly(n), and k = ω(log n). Suppose CH and SH as described above are sequential and collision-resistant hash functions with respect to index distribution D and let β < 1 be any constant. Then there exists a time-lock puzzle as follows:
• Generation. The puzzle generator Gen simply outputs a sample P $ ← D.
• Solving. The honest solver Sol runs in time (t ch + t sh + polylog(N )) · N to generate the puzzle solution.
• Verification. 
• Completeness. When the honest solver Sol interacts with the verifier Ver, Ver accepts with probability 1.
• We describe our construction using an interactive verifier in a hybrid model with access to an ideal commitment functionality Com that remains hiding against selective opening (the commitment scheme allows a short commitment to a set of blocks (u1, . . . , un), and later allows the prover to selectively open block uj for every j ∈ [N ]). We then replace the ideal commitment with a commitment scheme using Merkle tree based on the collision-resistant hash function CH. If a single evaluation of the hash function takes time t ch , then commitment to N blocks using Com can be done in time t ch · N and verification in time t ch · log N (see Section C for details). Algorithms 1 and 2 describes the honest solver and Algorithm 3 describes the corresponding verifier.
Algorithm 1 Honest solver Sol solving puzzle P using sequential hash family sh indexed with P and output length n, and a DAG G of in-degree d and N vertices given in topological order.
1: Initially assign the hash label u0 = 0 n to the extra redundant node (see Remark 3.5). • The puzzle generator Gen outputs P $ ← Dn.
• The puzzle solver Sol executes Algorithms 1 and 2, and the puzzle verifier Ver executes Algorithm 3.
Proving Theorem 3.7
To prove Theorem 3.7, we feed Construction 3.9 with the following type of depth-robust graphs.
Lemma 3.10 (Explicit Depth-Robust Graphs). For all constants β < α and all N there is an explicit family of (α, β)-depth robust graphs with N vertices and in-degree
The proof of Lemma 3.10 is based on the ideas from [EGS75] and is presented in Section B
We now prove Theorem 3.7 by analyzing the properties of Construction 3.9 when instantiated by depth-robust graphs specified in Lemma 3.10.
Completeness. Clearly if the puzzle solver and the verifier follow Algorithms 1, 2, and 3, then the verifier accepts with probability one.
Running Times. The following lemma can be verified by inspecting Algorithms 1, 2, and 3, and the Merkle commitment algorithms of Section C. These bounds imply the bounds of Theorem 3.7 when substituting d = O(log 3 N ) which is the degree of the DAG G we will use (according to Lemma 3.10).
Lemma 3.11. The running time of the parties in Construction 3.9 is as follows.
• Generation. The puzzle generator Gen simply outputs a sample string from Dn.
• Honest Solver. The solver, in its first round of action simply calls Adv1 and returns its output directly as the puzzle solution. To generate the hash labels, the solver Sol first constructs the DAG G in time N · polylog(N ) and then evaluates the sequential hash sh(·) N times for the vertices of G (over inputs of length d·n and outputs of length n). To commit to the hash labels, the solver evaluates the collision-resistant hash function ch(·) at most N/2 + N/4 + · · · ≤ N times over inputs of length 2n and outputs of length n. Therefore, if calling sh(·) takes time t sh and calling ch(·)
takes time t ch , the total running time of Sol will be (t sh + t ch + polylog N ) · N .
• Verifier. To answer each of the k challenges asked by the verifier, the solver (now playing as a prover) needs to send 2 · (d + 1) · log N strings of length n (which are computed already) to the verifier. Also, for each of these k challenges, the verifier first constructs the relevant part of G in time polylog(N ), and then it evaluates the sequential hash sh(·) once (in time t sh ) and evaluates ch(·) 2·(d+1)·log N times all in parallel time t ch (see Algorithm 7).
Parallel Soundness of Construction 3.9. The following lemma shows that by using an explicit (α, β)-depth robust graphs G for constants β < α from Lemma 3.10 in Construction 3.9, we can derive the soundness property stated in Theorem 3.7.
Lemma 3.12. Suppose the DAG G used in Construction 3.9 is (α, β)-depth-robust for some constants 0 < β < α < 1.
Then any malicious solver who is a circuit of size poly(n, N ) and depth at most τ · N · β till returning the puzzle solution is able to make the verifier accept with at most negl(n) probability.
We first finish the proof of Theorem 3.7 using Lemma 3.12 and then will prove Lemma 3.12.
Concluding Theorem 3.7.
Since we have k = ω(log n) Theorem 3.7 follows as a corollary from Lemmas 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12, because (1) it holds that d = O(log 3 N ) and (2) for k = ω(log n) and α = 1−Ω(1) it holds that α k = negl(n). We first outline the proof of Lemma 3.12 and then will present the formal proof.
Outline of Proof of Lemma 3.12. Roughly speaking, for the committed labeling u1, . . . , uN by the adversary Adv, we call a node i ∈ [N ] a good node if its hash label is indeed equal to the hash of the labels of its in-neighbors. If the number of good nodes is at most α · N , then the probability that the adversary can convince the verifier is at most α k + negl(n). On the other hand, if the number of good nodes are more than α · N then there should be path consisting of at least β · N many good nodes. The latter path, however, corresponds to a "chain" of queries, and the sequential property of sh(·) ensures that to generate such a chain the adversary must run in time proportional to the length of the chain.
More formally, the proof is by a reduction showing how to use an adversary that breaks η-soundness (i.e., can convince a verifier to accept a solution while working in "small" parallel time) to break the sequential soundness of sh (i.e., produce a "long" hash chain in "small" parallel time) as follows. Given an adversary Adv who breaks soundness of the time-lock puzzle scheme, we run Adv until it outputs the commitment c. We then execute O(N ) verification sessions using O(N ) copies of Adv. In each of these verification sessions we emulate a verifier that queries different vertices of the DAG, with the hope that after this stage we gather the labeling of "many" vertices of the DAG. The main challenges of the proof of soundness lie in the analysis of this reduction. Since Adv succeeds in convincing the verifier to accept with non-negligible probability, at most a constant fraction of the extracted labels can be "bad" (i.e., don't correspond to a hash of their in-neighbors' labels). Thus, by the depth-robustness property of the graph G, there must be a long path of good vertices in G. This path is exactly the hash-chain we are looking for.
Formal Proof of Lemma 3.12
In the following we start by assuming (for sake of contradiction) that there is an adversary Adv1 who breaks the parallel-soundness of Construction 3.9 with probability at least ε1 ≥ 1/ poly(n) (when using a (α, β)−depth-robust graph of degree O(log 3 N )), has circuit size poly(n, N ) and depth τ · N · β till sending the puzzle solution. Then we will show how to turn this adversary into another adversary that either breaks the sequential property of sh(·) or the binding property of the commitment (which by Lemma C.1 implies breaking the collision resistance of ch). its view has a chain of length βN in sh(·) . Note that assuming ε ′ 1 > 1/ poly(n), the running time of Adv2 is only poly(n, N ) times that of Adv1.
Using Lemma 3.13 to Conclude Lemma 3.12. After obtaining the adversary Adv2 we can break the assumption that sh(·) is τ -sequential (which is a contradiction) as follows. The adversary Adv2 will simply forward the puzzle solution c of Adv1 (i.e., the Merkle-commitment string) as the label of the last node of the chain. Then, later on, suppose Adv2 has access to a set of hash labels u1, . . . , uN such that there is a chain of length at least β · N planted in them. Then, by Lemma 3.13, Adv2 is able to find a path − → PT of length at least β · N in G whose labels are all accepted during the verification phase. This means that the revealed labels along the paths that connect the nodes of − → PT to the root of the Merkle-tree are all extracted successfully. Adv2 will simply return the labels of − → PT followed by the labels of the nodes connecting the last node of − → PT to the root (which is c). Therefore, Adv is able to win in the security game of Construction 3.1 with non-negligible probability by finding a chain of depth β · N in depth < τ · β · N till sending c. This violates the assumption that sh(·) is τ -sequential.
Algorithm 4 Either find a collision or extract a β ·N -chain, by using oracle access to an adversary Adv1 who convinces the interactive verifier with probability ε1 = ε
1: Run Adv1 over a random puzzle P $ ← {0, 1} n and random coins rand2 and receive some commitment c ∈ {0, 1} n . At this moment save the state of the adversary Adv1 since we are going to execute Adv1 in many "different branches" in parallel by feeding many different challenge messages to Adv1 and asking it to open those commitments. We cannot afford to use standard "rewinding" since we want to keep the depth of the circuit of Adv2 close to that of Adv1. (without considering the final verification). So we only need to prove the existence of the long chain in sh(·) in the view of Adv2, assuming that Adv2 did not break the binding property of Com(·).
Since Adv1 succeeds in convincing the verifier with probability at least ε1, by an averaging argument, with probability at least ε ′ 1 /2 over the choices of the puzzle P and the randomness of Adv1 (i.e., rand2), Adv1 will have at least a chance of α k + ε ′ 1 /2 (over the randomness of the challenge message) to convince the verifier. In the following we assume that the sampled P and rand2 in Step 1 of Algorithm 4 have this property. We will show that in this case, Adv2 succeeds in finding a (long enough) chain with probability at least 9/10, leading to a total probability of success at least (ε 
which is at most α k +ε ′ 1 /2 as opposed to our assumption. On the other hand, since Adv2 chooses ℓ random challenge sets Sj of size k, for every heavy node i ∈ [N ], the probability that for some j ∈ [ℓ] Adv1 can successfully decommit to all of the nodes in Sj while it includes i ∈ Sj is at least 1
Therefore, by a union bound, with probability at least 1 − 2 −n · N > 1 − 2 −Ω(n) for every heavy node v, the adversary will decommit successfully (at some point) into some hash label for v and also some hash labels for the in-neighbors of v. When the latter holds we call v a good node, and call the (successfully opened) hash labels of v and its in-neighbors some extracted hash labels (note that potentially we might extract different hash labels for v in different branches of executing Adv1 over some challenge set S).
Note that we can safely assume that for all i ∈ [N ] all the extracted hash labels for the node i ∈ [N ] (either extracted as the label of a sampled node in a challenge set, or as the label of an in-neighbor of a sampled node) are identical. The reason is that otherwise we would have broken the binding property of Com(·).
Therefore with probability at least 1 − 2 −Ω(n) , we get at least α · N good nodes (with some extracted hash label for them and also for their in-neighbors) and also it holds that all the extracted hash labels are consistent (i.e., equal for the same node). By the (α, β)-depth-robustness of G, the set of good nodes will have an induced path − → PT of size at least β · N . For every node v ∈ − → PT, let wv be equal to the string (uv 1 , . . . , uv d ) where v1 ≤ · · · ≤ v d are the in-neighbors of v. Since − → PT includes only good nodes that have passed the verification of the verifier, it holds that shP (wv) = uv where uv is the extracted hash label of v. Hence, the sequence (wv) v∈ − → PT makes a chain of size β · N . Thus, conditioned on the quality of the sampled (P, rand2) as discussed above, with probability (1 − 2
−Ω(n) ) > 9/10 the adversary Adv2 gets a chain of size at least β · N + log N > β · N (including the nodes connecting − → PT to the root of the Merkle tree).
OPEN QUESTIONS
Using Time-Lock Puzzles to Achieve Fairness. One motivation for studying time-lock puzzles, and timed assumptions in general, is that they can be used to solve problems that are provably impossible in the standard model. For example, Boneh and Naor showed that timed commitments (ones that can be opened without the key in certain amount of time, but not faster) can be used to perform fair coin flipping [BN00] , which was previously shown by Cleve to be impossible in the standard model [Cle86] . For this protocol to work, the time it takes to force open a commitment must be more than the maximum network latency. On the other hand, for efficiency, the time it takes to honestly open a commitment should be short as possible. Mahmoody et al. [MMV11] showed that, in the random oracle model, timed commitments with a large time-gap (between the forced opening and an honest opening) cannot be constructed, hence we cannot use black-box constructions to implement them in the standard model. A natural approach would be to replace the timed commitment in the coin-flipping protocol with our proof of work: Alice sends a puzzle P to Bob, Bob sends a random bit-vector b2, then Alice sends a bit-vector b1 and proves it is the solution to the puzzle P . The result is taken to be b1 · b2. This would be less efficient than using timed commitments, since Alice has to solve the puzzle even in an honest execution, but she can do the work offline, leaving the online phase of the protocol efficient. Unfortunately, this protocol is insecure: the soundness of our proof of work ensures that Alice spends time proportional to the honest solver, but still she may convince Bob to accept an incorrect solution b1. An interesting open question is whether fair secure computation (and in particular fair coin flipping) is possible based on black-box sequentiality assumptions.
Necessity of Depth-Robust Graphs. The efficiency and security of our construction is tightly tied to the parameters of depth-robust graph constructions: graphs with lower degree give more efficient solutions, while graphs with higher robustness (the lower bound on the length of the longest path remaining after some of the vertices are removed) give us puzzles with smaller adversarial advantage. An interesting open question is whether the converse also holds: do time-lock puzzles with better parameters also imply the existence of depth-robust graphs with better parameters? Space Complexity of the Solver. In our construction of time stamping and time-lock puzzles for time N , the solver keeps the hash labels of a graph of N vertices. Is there any other solution that uses o(N ) storage? Or is there any inherent reason that Ω(N ) storage is necessary? APPENDIX A. TIME-LOCK PUZZLES IN THE RANDOM ORACLE MODEL
Our construction for Theorem 3.7 makes black-box use of sequential hash functions and collision-resistant hash functions. Both primitives can be easily constructed with unconditional security in the random oracle model (when timecomplexity is measured by the number of oracle queries rather than computational effort) for every index distribution with super-logarithmic min-entropy. As a consequence, in this model we get unconditionally secure time-lock puzzles and time stamping schemes for any puzzle and/or document distribution with super-logarithmic min-entropy. Moreover, we can obtain time stamping protocols for any document distribution of super-logarithmic min-entropy.
More formally, in the random oracle model we model Time(·) as the number of oracle queries and ParTime(·) as the number of rounds of oracle queries. However, in the random oracle model (ROM), we can get stronger results: our construction is noninteractive and unconditionally secure. We prove the following theorem. We prove Theorem A.1 by proving the following lemma, and using Fiat-Shamir transformation [FS86b] 
A.1 Unconditional Interactive Construction in the ROM
In this subsection we prove Lemma A.2.
Implementing Hash Functions sh(·) and ch(·).
For puzzle distributions of super-logarithmic mi-entropy, we pad the puzzle to become of size |P| ≥ n, and we use a random oracle of the same security parameter O : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n as follows. The sequential hash function indexed by the puzzle P, denoted shP (·) is defined as follows: shP (x) = O(P, 0, x). To get the collision resistant hash function, we use chP (x) = O(P, 1, x) to map 2n bit strings to n bits. Note that since our adversaries in this work always ask poly(n) < 2 o(n) queries to O, at the time P $ ← D is sampled, (except with negl(n) probability) no query with prefix P is asked to O and therefore we can safely assume that both oracles sh(·) and ch(·) are completely random even conditioned on the poly(n) preprocessing queries asked by the adversary. Therefore, to prove Lemma A.2 we just need to prove that random oracles can be directly used to get sequential and collision-resistant hash functions.
First we recall the well-known fact that a random oracle is collision-resistant. We first show how to conclude Lemma A.5 using Claim A.6. Suppose Adv is an adversary with oracle access to sh(·) who can break the sequential property of sh(·) according to Definition 3.2. By Claim A.6, the view of Adv after sending y as the last node the chain (in Construction 3.1) does not have any chain of length at least N . If Adv outputs any chain of length at least N ending at y, implies that Adv asks a total of 2 o(n) queries and inverts sh(·) over some y ′ in its view such that sh(y ′ ) is not called by Adv (at the time y ′ was already in the view of Adv). It is easy to see that, such inversion of a random oracle can succeed only with probability 2 o(n) when sh(·) is a random oracle. Now, we prove Claim A.6. Suppose A has asked the queries x1, . . . , x ℓ so far and is about to ask a new round of queries y1 . . . , yq. We claim that with probability 1 − 2
the new queries y1, . . . , yq can only be the last nodes in any new chain in the view of A. Since the total number of queries of A is 2 o(n) we only need to prove the latter claim for one of the new queries, yi ∈ {y1, . . . , yq} and the claim follows by a union bound. Let X = {x1, . . . , x ℓ , y1, . . . , yi−1, yi+1, . . . , yq} be all the queries of A asked (or about to be asked) so far other than yi. The total number of (contiguous) substrings of length n among all the elements of X is at most
(because all those queries are of length 2 o(n) any substring is determined by choosing two points in the string). Since the answer to sh(yi) is a random string of length n, this answer will be different from all the contiguous substrings of the elements of X with probability at least
. Therefore, with probability at least 1 − 2
−Ω(n) the length of the longest chain in the view of A can increase in each rounds of adaptive queries of A only by one (except with probability 2
−Ω(n) ). Thus (by induction) the probability that A can output a chain of length r in r − 1 rounds of queries is at most 2
Lemmas A.5 and A.3 together Lemma A.2, which in turn proves our Theorem A.1 for the case of interactive verification.
A.2 Noninteractive Verification Using the FiatShamir Transformation
In the random oracle model, by using the Fiat-Shamir transformation of Lemma A.7 we can remove the challenge message of the verifier in Construction 3.9 to make the verification completely noninteractive and obtain Theorem A.1.
Similarly to the previous subsection, here also we assume w.l.o.g. that the oracle O is completely random at the time the puzzle P $ ← D is chosen and given to the adversary. This is because we can pad all queries to O with (P, 3) and apply a similar argument to that of the sequential and collision hash functions SH, CH above based on the ω(log n) min-entropy of D.
The following transformation is due to Fiat and Shamir [FS86a] and shows how to remove interaction from public-coin protocols in the random oracle model. For completeness, here we prove a special case in which there is only four messages exchanged, while we are interested in (almost) preserving the adaptivity of the adversary.
Lemma A.7 (Fiat-Shamir Transformation). Suppose (P, V ) is two party protocol using a random oracle O of output length n as follows.
• The protocol has only 4 messages: v1, p1, v2, p2 where v1 and v2 are public-coin messages of V and V does not use any private randomness to make her final decision.
• We have |v1| = n and |v2| ≤ ℓ · n.
• The verifier rejects its interaction with probability 1−ε against any prover P who:
1. P asks a total ofueries to the random oracle O.
2. P has at most r rounds of adaptivity in its queries.
is a two-message protocol defined based on (P, V ) as follows: The second message v2 of V is removed from the protocol and instead the oracle answers to the following queries are used O (v1, p1, 1), O(v1, p1, 2) 
Proof. For sake of contradiction suppose P ′ is an adversary who interacts with V ′ , asks at most q ′ = q/ℓ queries to O, has at most r ′ = r −1 rounds of adaptivity, and is able to convince V ′ with probability ε ′ > ε · q. We show how to get an adversary P who interacts with V , asks at most q ′ · ℓ = q oracle queries, has at most r rounds of adaptivity and is able to make V accept with probability at least ε ′ /q = ε, which is a contradiction.
First we modify P ′ as follows.
• P ′ never asks any query twice.
• P ′ always asks the queries O(v1, p1, 1), O(v1, p1, 2), . . . , O(v1, p1, ℓ) before sending (p1, p2) in one round of adaptivity, if not asked already.
• The above changes might increase the total queries of P ′ by a factor of ℓ and might add one round of adaptive queries to P ′ . The adversary P works as follows:
1. When P ′ asks for v1, receive v1 from V and forward it to P ′ .
Choose i
3. Emulate the execution of P ′ by preserving the adaptivity of the queries as follows. We claim that with probability 1/q over the random choice of i $ ←[q] the game above is a perfect emulation of the game in which P ′ interacts with V ′ . The reason is that with probability 1/q the emulating adversary P guesses the actual query O(v1, p1, 1) of P ′ correctly, in which case since v2 is completely random, we get a perfect emulation of the game of interaction between P ′ and V ′ in the random oracle model (where a particular oracle query is answered using fresh randomness). Thus the emulation above leads to the accept of V with probability at least ε ′ · 1/q = ε, while the number of rounds of oracle queries asked by P is at most r.
B. EXPLICIT CONSTRUCTIONS OF DEPTH ROBUST GRAPHS
In this section we prove Lemma 3.10 by showing how to obtain explicit (α, β)-depth robust graphs for constants α, β < 1 that can be arbitrarily close to 1. Erdős, Graham and Szemerédi [EGS75] constructed (α, β)-depth robust graphs for some constants 0 < β < α < 1 based on a recursive use of constant-degree expanders. This construction can be made explicit using any explicit family of such expanders.
Theorem B.1 ( [EGS75]). There exists an explicit family {GN } of DAGs with N vertices and in-degree
Using the proof of [EGS75] one can obtain, e.g., α = 99/100, β = 1/100, but by minor modifications to the construction of [EGS75] one can obtain constants (α, β) that are arbitrarily close to 1 at the cost of larger degrees log 2 N . For sake of completeness, in Section B we describe this construction. Our construction follows that of [EGS75] closely, with the difference that we use denser expanding graphs in the recursive construction. 
Definition B.2 (Expanding Graphs). A bipartite graph
} and the edges are
} .
Degrees and Explicitness.
The explicit expanding graphs we used in Construction B.3 to connect the two copies of Gi are all of in-degree O(log N ) < log 2 N for large enough N . Since the depth of the recursion is ⌈log N ⌉, the total in-degree of the final graph is at most O(log 2 N ) < log 3 N for large enough N . The explicitness of our constructed graph follows from the explicitness of the expanding graphs used. In particular, given any node
where bi is the i-th bit of the binary representation of v − 1. To know the list of in-neighbors of v in G = Gt we will consider every i ∈ [t] such that bi = 1. The fact that bi = 1 means that in the construction of Gi, the node v has been in the set Ri and we should find the list of the vertices Li that are connected to it. The list of in-neighbors of v in Gi (which are due to the edges of the expanding graphs planted in Gi) can be computed in time polylog N (due to explicitness of Gi). Suppose the latter list is {v1, . . . , v ℓ } where the binary representation of the numbers vj − 1 (for all j ∈ [ℓ]) have i − 1 bits. To get the index of vj as a node in G we can take uj = 1 + (bt, . . . , bi+1, 0, (vj − 1)). To find out all the inneighbors of v in G we just have to go over all i ∈ ⌈log N ⌉ and extract the in-neighbors as above.
Depth-Robustness. We now prove the depth-robustness of the DAG of Construction B.3.
Lemma B.4 . For every i and α ∈ (0, 1) , the graph Gi is (α, α − iγ)-depth-robust, and since γ = ε/log N , the final graph G = G log N is (α, α − ε)-depth-robust for every α ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. The proof is by induction over i. For i = 1, Gi consists of two vertices, and is trivially (α, α) depthrobust for all α ∈ (0, 1). Assuming the hypothesis holds for i, consider the graph Gi+1 = ((Li+1, Ri+1), Ei+1).
Fix an arbitrary α ∈ (0, 1). Suppose we select a subset S of the nodes of Gi+1 of size at least α · 2 i+1 and call them "good" nodes. Let δ2 i be the number of good nodes SL ⊆ S in Li+1. Since the total number of good nodes is α2 i+1 , there must be at least (2α − δ)2 i good nodes SR ⊆ S in Ri+1. Below, by the length |P | of a path P we denote the number of vertices in it.
By the induction hypothesis, there exists a path PL ⊆ SL of good nodes such that |PL| ≥ (δ − iγ)2 i . In the same way, there exists a path PR ⊆ SR such that |PR| ≥ (2α−δ−iγ)2 i . We must show that there exists a path P ⊆ SL ∪ SR = S such that |P | ≥ (α−(i+1)γ)2 i+1 . If δ ≤ 2γ, then we can simply set P = PR, since in this case |PR| ≥ (2α − (i + 2)γ)2 i ≥ (α − (i + 1)γ)2 i+1 . On the other hand if δ ≥ 2α − 2γ, then in the same way we can set P = PL. Otherwise, consider the set PR ⊆ PR consisting of the first ⌈γ2 i ⌉ nodes on PR and the set PL ⊆ PL consisting of the last ⌈γ2 i ⌉ nodes on PL. Since Gi+1 contains a (1/γ)-expanding graph between the nodes of Li+1 and Ri+1, and given that | PL| = | PR| = ⌈γ2 i ⌉, there exists an edge (vL, vR) ∈ Ei+1 going from PL to PR. We define our new path P by connecting (most of) the paths PL and PR together with the edge (vL, vR) as follows: P is defined to be the nodes in PL up to the node vL, concatenated with the nodes of PR starting from the node vR. This way the number of vertices in P is at least 
C. COMMITMENTS BY MERKLE TREES
Algorithm 5 shows how a Merkle tree is computed as a commitment to a set of strings with the possibility of opening the commitment to each string separately. Algorithm 6 describes how the opening is performed. To verify the decommitment of Algorithm 6 the receiver simply verifies the corresponding hash evaluations according to Algorithm 7. For simplicity, in this section we assume that the N strings being committed to are indexed by {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} (rather than [N ] ), but when we use the Merkle commitment we might choose to index the strings with [N ] .
The following lemma asserts that if the family of hash functions CH from which ch(·) is sampled is collision resistant, then the commitment scheme based on the Merkle tree is binding. It can be shown that the commitment using Merkle trees has some strong hiding properties as well, but here we are only concerned with the binding property of such efficient commitments. 
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